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CORPORATIONS-OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS-LIABILITY FOR REPRESENTA-

AcTS UNDER THE SHERMAN Acr-An indictment brought under section
I of the Sherman Act charged appellee and the corporation that employed
him with conspiracy to eliminate price competition in the greater Kansas
City milk market. Appellee was charged solely, in his capacity as officer,
director or agent of the corporation. The district court dismissed the indictment on the ground that natural persons are indictable under section I
of the Sherman Act only for acts done on their own account. On direct
appeal to the Supreme Court,1 held, reversed and remanded. A corporate

TIVE

1 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1958) allows the Government to appeal directly to the Supreme
Court when a district court dismisses a criminal indictment upon a construction of
the statute on which the indictment is founded.
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officer is liable under section 1 of the Sherm.an Act whether he acted on his
own account or solely in a representative capacity. United States v. Wise,
370 U.S. 405 (1962).
As enacted in 1890,2 section 1 of the Sherman Act made "every person"
who violated its provisions subject to a maximum fine of five thousand
dollars, but this was raised to fifty thousand by amendment in 1955.3 Section 14 of the Clayton Act, 4 enacted in 1914, reaches "individual directors,
officers, or agents," and imposes a maximum fine of five thousand dollar§.
In the principal case, the issue on appeal was essentially whether corporate
officers who violate antitrust laws while acting solely in their representative
capacities are subject to the more severe fine imposed by the Sherman Act.IS
The sources available for interpreting the Sherman Act suggest opposing conclusions. At common law an agent could be punished for crimes
committed for his principal6 and, by 1890, it was recognized that this rule
made corporate officers liable for crimes committed in their representative
2 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal • • • • Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy declared . • • to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine • • •
or by imprisonment ••• or by both •.••" 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ I (1958).
3 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § I (1958), amending 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
4 "Whenever a corporation shall violate any of the penal provisions of the antitrust
laws, such violation shall be deemed to be also that of the individual directors, officers,
or agents of such corporation who shall have authorized, ordered, or done any of the
acts constituting in whole or in part such violation, and such violation shall be deemed
a misdemeanor, and upon conviction therefor of any such director, officer, or agent he
shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding $5,000 or by imprisonment for not exceeding one year, or by both, in the discretion of the court." 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15
u.s.c. § 24 (1958).
IS Although the principal case was briefed and decided solely on the basis of legal
arguments, it also suggests certain questions of policy. That businessmen can be punished as criminals for acts done strictly in the pursuit of economic objectives must
be regarded as settled in view of the existence and enforcement of the Sherman Act
for over seventy years. There has been continued reluctance, though, to regard such
"white-collar crimes" as really criminal in the ordinary and moralistic sense of the
word. This reluctance has manifested itself in the failure of judges to impose stringent fines (the average fine imposed on convicted officers has been only slightly more
than $2,100; Whiting, Antitrust and the Corporate Executive, 47 VA. L. REv. 929, 943
(1961)] and in the public furor created when officers are actually given jail terms, as
in the recent electrical industry price-fixing cases. The principal case clearly shows,
however, that the Court is willing to subject corporate officers who act solely on behalf
of their corporation to very large fines. Whereas most sizable corporations could absorb
a $50,000 fine, such a fine would be a severe burden on even highly-paid executives.
If the officer committed the violation for some personal advantage, a large fine might
be justifiable; but a $50,000 fine for acts done merely in a representative capacity seems
more controversial. That the Court has thrown its whole weight behind such a possibility may indicate and presage a shift in judicial attitude which, if detected and
acted upon by the Attorney General and the lower federal courts, could spell a new
and harsher era in the prosecution of individuals under the Sherman Act.
a I BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 892 (7th ed. 1882).
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capac1t1es, even though the corporation might also be punishable.7 Assuming that Congress chose the words with an eye to their common-law
meaning, "every person" as used in section I might seem to include officers
acting in their representative capacities.8 It must be recognized, however,
that the phrase "every person" is qualified by the words that follow it.
Section I purports to cover only "every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy." Since only corporations, individuals acting on their own account, and other legally recognized
economic entities can "make contracts"9 or "engage in combinations or
conspiracies" in restraint of trade,10 the better construction of the statutory
language is that it does not reach officers acting in their representative
capacities.
On the other hand, the legislative history of the Sherman Act suggests
a contrary conclusion. Senator Sherman's original bill had a criminal
section that specifically included officers acting in their representative
capacities.11 The criminal section was later removed, 12 but Senator Reagan
introduced a substitute bill with a similar criminal provision,13 and this
was adopted as an amendment to the Sherman bill14 before it was sent
back to the committee.15 The bill went through extensive redrafting, and
the words "every person" were adopted in place of the specific enumerations in the criminal provisions.16 No reason was given for this change in
wording,17 and it may have been made merely to improve and simplify
the language of the bill.
A number of cases were brought under section I of the Sherman Act
between 1890 and 1914, but in none of them was an indictment against an
individual dismissed on the ground that section I did not cover his cor7 State v. Morris 8e E. R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360, 369 (1852); R. v. Great No. of Eng. Ry.,
[1846] 9 Q.B. 315, 325-27, 115 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1298.
s Although § 8 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1958), defines
"person" "to include corporations and associations," this does not mean that corporate
officers are thereby excluded. This section seems to have been included to dispel any
doubts as to whether corporations ·were criminally liable, a question not fully settled
in 1890. See New York Cent. &: H.R.R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
9 See R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 320, 328 (1958).
10 It is generally recognized that an employee acting within the scope of his office
cannot conspire with his corporation. See, e.g., Union Pac. Coal Co. v. United States,
173 Fed. 737, 745 (8th Cir. 1909); Whiteley v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 914,
923 (W.D. Ark. 1957), a/j'd, 254 F.2d 36 (8th Cir. 1958).
11 S. I, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1889).
12 21 CoNG. REc. 1765 (1890). It was feared that the bill would be construed nar•
rowly if it contained criminal sanctions. See id. at 2456-57.
13 S. 62, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1889).
14 21 CONG. REc. 2560-61, 2611 (1890). Senator Sherman later acknowledged his
approval of the Reagan amendment. Id. at 2655.
15 Id. at 2731.
16 Id. at 2731, 3152.
17 Senator Hoar, who was primarily responsible for the language of the bill, stated
that he would not explain it as its meaning .was well understood. 21 CONG. REc. 3145
(1890). The bill was adopted approximately as redrafted by a vote of 52-1. Id. at 3153.
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porate acts. 18 Of these cases, however, only two involved the question of
whether the Sherman Act could penalize the representative acts of corporate officers. In both cases such acts were deemed covered, 19 but in
neither was such a finding necessary to the decision.20 Thus, the Court
could not base its holding in the principal case on the language of the
statute or on its previous judicial interpretation. Although it could claim
some support from the relevant legislative history, congressional intent is
not clear enough to justify fully the unqualified decision of the Court.
Although examined at length in the principal case, the Clayton Act
was relevant to the Court's inquiry only insofar as it may have partially
repealed section 1 of the Sherman Act, or extended antitrust penal provisions beyond the scope of the Sherman Act.21 Section 14 contains no
language expressly repealing section 1,22 and the positive repugnance required to find an implied repeal23 is absent. Whereas a clear and manifest
intention of the legislature would also seem necessary, 24 the legislative
history of the Clayton Act in fact shows a clear intent to leave the Sherman
Act untouched,25
This, however, does not necessarily settle the relationship between
section I and section 14. There remain three possible views: (I) that section 14 alone punishes the representative acts of corporate officers, (2)
18 The Government prepared a table of forty cases brought between 1890 and 1914
in which corporate officials were indicted for violation of the Sherman Act. Brief for
Appellant, pp. 69-72, principal case.
19 "[The Sherman Act] seems to me clearly passed in contemplation of the elementary principle that •.• all those who personally aid and abet in its [violation] are
indictable as principals .•.• [U]nder this statute, if the officer or agent of a corporation charged with fault be also charged with personal participation, direction, or activity
therein, both may be so charged in the same indictment." United States v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Co., 149 Fed. 823, 832 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906). "[N]either in the civil nor the
criminal law can an officer protect himself behind a corporation where he is the actual,
present, and efficient actor; ••• all parties active in promoting a misdemeanor, whether
agents or not, are principals." United States v. Winslow, 195 Fed. 578, 581 (D. Mass.
1912).
20 In United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., supra note 19, the court recognized that it could be inferred from the indictment that the individuals were acting
on their own account. All that the court had to decide was that such persons were not
shielded from criminal responsibility. In United States v. Winslow, supra note 19, the
individuals were charged with having used corporations as devices to control industry.
All that the court had to decide was that individuals who use sham corporations for
their personal ends were covered by the Sherman Act. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring
in the principal case, points out the weaknesses of these cases. Principal case at 420.
21 As the Court pointed out, what the 1914 Congress thought the Sherman Act
~ meant is irrelevant to the interpretation of that statute. Principal case at 414.
22 See the statutory language quoted in note 2 supra.
23 United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939).
24 Ibid.
25 For example, Representative Floyd, a House manager, stated, ""We have not
disturbed the penal provisions in the existing antitrust laws, including the Sherman
law." 51 Cor-m. REc. 16317 (1914). The Senate committee report on the bill pointed
out that "it is not proposed by the bill or amendments to alter, amend, or change
in any respect the original Sherman Antitrust Act of July 2, 1890." S. REP. No. 698,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
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that section 14 merely restates the penal provisions applicable to such acts
under section I, or (3) that section 14 in part duplicates section I and in
part extends criminal liability for representative acts. By concluding that
the Sherman Act did reach representative acts, the Court ruled out the
first possibility. But in choosing between the latter two, the Court has
expressed inconsistent views. It points out that in enacting section 14
Congress intended (a) to give a mandate to judges, jurors and prosecutors
who had been reluctant to convict corporate officers, (b) to punish for
the first time the ordering and authorizing of violations of the antitrust
laws, and (c) to punish acts which formed a part of antitrust violations,
but which were not, in themselves, previously culpable.26 Then, in summarizing the legislative history of section 14, the Court said that "insofar
as section 14 relates to the corporate officer who participates in the Sherman
Act violation, whether or not in a representative capacity, no change was
either intended or effected."27 This contradicts the former statement; Congress either intended something additional by passing section 14, or it did
not. More importantly, though, the quoted statement clearly indicates that
the Court has interpreted section 14 as a mere restatement of the penal
provisions of section 1.28 By talcing this stand, the Court implies that the
legislation was pointless.29 Such a view manifests a direct disregard for the
judicial canon that no statute should be construed so as to make it a nullity.so
The Court could have avoided the inconsistency in its approach by
holding that, although Congress intended this provision to extend existing law, it in fact did not. 31 But it would then be implying that the
20

Principal case at 412-14.

27

Id. at 414. (Emphasis added.)

28 That the Court meant to incorporate the entire coverage of § 14 into § 1 is
further established by the rule laid down in the principal case: "[A] corporate officer
is subject to prosecution under § 1 of the Sherman Act whenever he knowingly participates in effecting the illegal contract, combination, or conspiracy-be he one who
authorizes, orders, or helps perpetrate the crime-regardless of whether he is acting
in a representative capacity." Principal case at 416. "Helps perpetrate" includes the
meaning of "done" in § 14, and "participates in effecting" has the same scope as "in
whole or in part." The rest of the language is directly from § 14.
29 Although the quoted statement is seemingly limited by the words "insofar as § 14
relates to . • . the Sherman Act," this is unimportant. When the Clayton Act was
passed in 1914 only two other statutes besides the Sherman Act had penal antitrust
provisions, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, § 10, 24 Stat. 382, as amended, 36
Stat. 349 (1910), 49 U.S.C. § 10 (1958), and the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894, 28 Stat. 570,
as amended, 36 Stat. 667 (1913), 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1958). Both of these acts specifically
named officers and agents as within their scope. Therefore, § 14 could have no more
effect on them than the Court decides it has on the Sherman Act.
so Bird v. United States, 187 U.S. 118 (1902); Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112
(1879).
31 In view of the legislative history it cannot be doubted that Congress intended to
do something by passing § 14. Over forty pages of volume 51 of the Congressional
Record are devoted to discussions of § 14. Some opponents felt that it added nothing
to existing law [See 51 CONG. R.Ec. 9079, 9201, 9610, 14214, 15820 (1914).], but the majority
unquestionably thought they were imposing some new criniinal liability on corporate
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professional lawmakers were unable to pass an effective law when they
had so intended. Alternatively, the Court might have decided that, although section I reached representative acts, section 14 did add something
new to the antitrust laws. This view raises the difficult problem of determining which acts made criminal by section 14 fall within section I, and
which do not. It can be argued that "making a contract" or "engaging
in a combination or conspiracy" is more in the nature of doing an act
than of authorizing or ordering one.32 It could also be maintained that
section 1 reaches only those who commit the whole violation, whereas
section 14 reaches those who violate the law in part or in whole. Adopting
these distinctions, the Court could have legitimately differentiated the portion of representative acts covered by section 1 from the whole range
covered by section 14. Such distinctions have substantial support in legislative history, 33 and would allow section 14 to stand as more than an
empty shell.34 If the Court made these distinctions, however, the lower
courts would be faced with constant problems of distinguishing "doing"
from "ordering" and violations in part from violations in whole. Such a
result would make it very difficult to prosecute corporate officers effectively.
Since both of the views which let section I operate against corporate
officers in their representative roles have serious drawbacks, the Court
might better have adopted the first possibility. That view makes section 14
the sole penal provision covering the representative acts of officers, and,
prior to the decision in the principal case, had been adopted by six district courts.35 This position can be justified by the language of the Sherman
officials that went beyond the existing Sherman Act liability. See id. at 9609, 9676,
9678-79, 9681, 16320.
32 "Make" and "engage" suggest direct activity, whereas "authorize" and "order,"
particularly the former, suggest a more removed and passive involvement.
33 For example, during the debates Representative Floyd said: "Under the existing
law, and without • • • [§ 14), the person who did the things would undoubtedly be
guilty; but in the enforcement of the criminal provisions of the Sherman law, experience has demonstrated that both juries and courts are slow to convict men who have
simply done acts authorized or ordered by some officers of the concern higher up, and
the words 'authorized' and 'ordered' were introduced to reach the real offenders, the
men who caused the things to be done." 51 CONG. R.Ec. 9609 (1914). See also id. at
9074, 9185, 9676-79, 16317.
34 However, it would require a different disposition of the principal case. The
district court would need to order the indictment amended to show whether the appellee
was charged with violating § 1 or only § 14.
35 United States v. Engelhard-Hanovia, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 1962 Trade Cas. 11 70203 (S.D. Cal.); United States v.
American Optical Co., 1961 Trade Cas. 11 70156 (E.D. Wis.); United States v. Milk
Distribs. Ass'n, 200 F. Supp. 792 (D. Md. 1961); United States v. A. P. Woodson Co.,
198 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1961); United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 196 F. Supp.
155 (W.D. Mo. 1961). The present case involved an appeal from the last case cited
above. Before the Wise case was decided, two other district courts had reached a result
contrary to that of the six cases above: United States v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc.,
202 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1962); United States v. Packard-Bell Electronics Corp., Cr.
No. 30158, S.D. Cal., 1961 (motion to dismiss indictment charging violations of both
§ 14 and § 1 denied without opinion).
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Act, 36 would give full effect to the legislature's intent that section 14 be
a meaningful law, and would not create any great difficulties in administering the antitrust laws.37
It is true that if the Government were forced to prosecute officers under
section 14, its burden of establishing guilt would be greater. Under that
section an officer can be convicted only if it is proved that his corporation violated the penal provisions of the antitrust laws, and that he authorized, ordered, or did the acts which constituted the violation in whole
o.r in part.38 Nonetheless, Congress purposely framed the statute in this
manner; section 14 was designed as an improved means of controlling corporations, and was intended to punish officers only as a means of coercing
compliance by corporations.39
It may be argued that the fines leviable under section 14 should be
the same as those possible under section I. This does not, however, defeat
the view that section 14 is the sole remedy against representative acts.
The 1955 increase in the Sherman Act penalty was not intended to exempt
officers in their representative roles from effective prosecution. Purely
practical considerations seem to have led Congress to raise tlie Sherman
Act fine and leave the penal provisions of the other antitrust laws as
they were.40 And, in the absence of this decision, there are indications that
Congress would have increased the fines possible under the other laws. 41
Defects in the law should be corrected by recourse to the legislature, and
86 See text at notes 8-10 supra. The legislative history and judicial interpretation
of the Sherman Act is too inconclusive to be controlling here. The distinction between
representative acts of a corporate officer and those done on his own account was not
clearly seen at the time, and most of the debates and cases are too ambiguous on
the issue to be decisive. 46 MINN. L. REv. 631 (1962) analyzes this issue in detail, and
Whiting, supra note 5, at 946-48, has helpful material. From them it is clear that on
the basis of the legislative history and judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act and
the Clayton Act alone, this case could have been decided either way.
87 Under this view corporate officers could be indicted under § 1 of the Sherman
Act only if it was alleged that the acts in question were committed on their own
account. This would not, though, make it difficult for the Government to lay a
proper indictment. The evidence it would have gathered before initiating a suit would
show in almost all cases whether the officer was acting on his own account or not.
38 This increased burden of proof under § 14 may explain, in part, why the
Government has nearly always chosen to indict corporate officers under the Sherman
Act; no officer has yet been brought to trial under § 14. Whiting, supra note 5, at
942. Although the difference in proof requirements between § 1 and § 14 might have
provided a sufficient motivation to raise the question of whether § 1 covered representative acts or not, in fact this question was not directly raised in any case between
1914 and 1960. This is probably because the ultimate penalty was the same under
§ 1 and § 14 until 1955.
89 See 51 CONG. REc. 9679-82 (1914).
40 In the House debates on an earlier version of the amendment that increased
the Sherman Act penalty, Representative Celler said: "We did not wish to encourage
too much opposition by including acts other than the Sherman Act •••• We are
willing to make progress slowly. Let us increase the penalties under the Sherman Act,
which is the most important of all the acts. Then subsequently we may consider the
other acts." 96 CoNG. REc. 8071 (1950).
41 Whiting, supra note 5, at 983.
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not by judicial decrees which bring about the desired end only by making
congressional enactments ineffectual.
The interpretation of congressional intention and the reasoning in
the principal case are unsatisfactory. Nonetheless, the holding is unequivocal, and the Court would find it difficult to limit its breadth in any
future decision.42 Though it established the rule that all acts violative of
section 14 also violate section I, the decision does not mention sections 2
and 3 of the Sherman Act.43 The maximum fine under these sections was
also raised to fifty thousand dollars in 1955.44 In dealing with sections 2
and 3, it is very doubtful that the Court will adopt the view suggested here
without overruling the principal case, 45 but these sections do provide a
possible vehicle for again bringing the entire issue before the Court.
Hopefully, a better analysis and resolution of the problem than is given
in the principal case would result from such litigation.

Leon E. Irish

The Court voted 8 to 0, Mr. Justice Frankfurter not participating.
26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3 (1958). Section 2 makes it
criminal to attempt to monopolize trade, and § 3 extends the Sherman Act to the
District of Columbia.
H 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3 (1958), amending 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
45 Since §§ 1, 2 and 3 of the Sherman Act treat the same basic subject, are part
of the same chapter, and were enacted in the same session of Congress, no clearer
case of laws being in pari materia could be presented. Accordingly they are to be
construed with reference to each other and in such a way as to prevent any disharmony
in the antitrust laws. See Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414 (1899).
-t2
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